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INTRODUCTION: LAW AND CULTURAL CONFLICT
SARAH HARDING*

Four years ago a small group of faculty at Chicago-Kent decided
that it was important to have a forum for discussion about the various
relationships between the humanities and law. Out of that discussion
emerged the Chicago-Kent Institute for Law and the Humanities.
The purpose of the Institute was, and continues to be, to encourage
interdisciplinary discussion of issues at the intersection of law and
culture. At the same time as plans for the Institute took form, the
idea for this symposium emerged. While the Institute has sponsored
and cosponsored a variety of programs looking at issues as diverse as
the culture of gun ownership and transgenic art, this symposium was
from the very beginning a primary goal. But as with many such ideas,
the symposium was delayed until the right people could put the
requisite amount of time into planning. As time passed, expectations
about the appropriate form and content changed. For some of those
involved, 9/11 also brought about planning difficulties, for it signaled
the possibility of a dramatic change in levels of tolerance. Would
* Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law and co-director of the Institute for
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these changes find their way into legal discourse? Were signs of
intolerance already there; had they always been there?
Despite differences in opinion, we pushed forward with the symposium and more or less let the carefully selected participants dictate
the direction of discussion. The reason for dredging up this brief
history is that it highlights the inevitable difficulty in dealing with the
relationship between two things that, on the one hand, are supposed
to be at arms length from each other, and on the other, are in fact
intimately connected. Law is, as Robert Post so cogently states in his
paper, "perennially implicated in cultural conflict."1 It does not,
indeed it cannot, exist separate from the cultures that produce it.
And yet to see it as merely an extension of culture would be a mistake. Law, with its deeply analytical structures and powers of affirmation, "constitut[es] the very culture in whose service it purports to
act."' 2 Those of us involved in organizing the conference found that
we in fact had different opinions about the depth and breadth of this
relationship and the constitutive power of law. Furthermore, we
turned to different kinds of scholarship to explore these issues. But in
the end it is discussion about such differences that really has made the
Institute and this symposium worthwhile.
Robert Post's introduction or general overview is enormously
helpful in setting out both the problems and the intrigue of exploring
the role of law in regulating cultural tensions. It would be foolish of
me to attempt to add to it. The only thing I would like to do in this
brief introduction is say a few things about how his comments reflect
some of the issues and tensions addressed in the other papers. Before
I do so, it needs to be stated that I was not at the symposium. At the
time of the conference, and indeed the time of writing this introduction, I was thousands of miles away. I have read all the papers with
great interest but I was not able to participate in the give-and-take
that must have occurred. This is clearly a disadvantage. And yet
perhaps distance has its own benefits. Viewing laws and legal practices from the outside is always revealing-ideas and structures of
analysis begin to take on a different light, no longer self-evident in
their meaning. At the very least they become uniquely tied to the
culture, in this case American legal culture, in which they are embedded. Whether one views this distance as an advantage or disadvantage, it is nonetheless the perspective I bring to these brief comments.
1. Robert Post, Law and CulturalConflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485,494 (2003).
2. Id.
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If there is one thing that is evident from all the papers and is
most clearly stated in Robert Post's introduction, neutrality is illusory. Laws by their very nature and in all their various formulations,
judicially or legislatively inspired, cannot be neutral. In mediating
between competing cultural perspectives, legal determinations are
never without cultural meaning-there are always winners and losers
on issues mediated through law and in the public realm. As Post
states, legal analysis entails "the responsibility of interpreting cultural
values."3 So neutrality seems to be the wrong entry point into questions about the legal regulation of cultural disagreements.
Perhaps a better entry point, one upon which so many of the papers turn, is toleration. How much tolerance is embedded in our
liberal-minded legal system and Constitution? The answer to this will
necessarily turn on the nature of the rights in question, as Post points
out, as well as how wedded we are to the cultural norms at stake.
Nancy Bentley's and Sarah Gordon's papers focus on family matters
that pushed tolerance beyond what mid to late-nineteenth-century
culture could bear-to the point of mocking the very notion of
tolerance. Bentley and Gordon show how contemporary novels
reveal that miscegenation and polygamy were not just alternative
ways of family life; they subverted the very nature of family life and
intimacy. Freedom to subvert was beyond the pale.
The outside limits of toleration, so evident in the papers focusing
on the legal regulation of the family, are also integral to the papers on
religion. Steven Smith and Mark Rosen make the case that this is one
area where law and government action quite clearly emanate from a
specific cultural, religious perspective-in Smith's words the "no
orthodoxy" position is untenable. But they have very different ways
of dealing with this reality. Tolerance for Smith requires little more
than protection from coercion-the commitment of the Constitution
is to avoid "coercing citizens to accept beliefs to which they do not
assent,"' 4 not to avoid the expression and affirmation of beliefs per se.
Rosen argues for a more intriguing solution. Focusing on the
"expressive harm" associated with the assumed neutrality of the
dominant liberal orthodoxy, he argues that tolerance requires providing more room specifically at the local level for religious practices
that seek to challenge the liberal expectation of the separation of

3. Id. at 498.
4. Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 667 (2003).
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church and state. In keeping with his other scholarship, Rosen argues
that liberalism itself requires avoidance of expressive harms by
accommodating illiberal practices, provided there are certain safeguards in place, most predominantly the option of exit. Here, as with
the family-related papers, we see the possibility of toleration being
pushed to the point at which we begin to worry about subverting the
culture of toleration itself. Is Rosen's argument "too tolerant?" 5
The expression papers are the most difficult precisely because, as
Post recognizes, this is one area where the Constitution seems to
provide the greatest latitude, the greatest measure of tolerance:
"First Amendment speech rights.., aim to promote norms that
affirmatively embrace the value of cultural heterogeneity." 6 But
there are two sides to this. Freedom of expression looks to both
"instantiate positive cultural values" while preventing the legal
regulation or enforcement of such values. 7 The tricky question then is
the balance between these two purposes. Robert Nagel's paper
suggests that while an open balancing of competing First Amendment
purposes based on extant political culture may have appeal, an
approach most recently displayed in the decisions of Justice Stevens,
it is no better at establishing the terms for resolving our "most bitter
disputes." Implicit in this is the idea that the terms and frameworks
for resolving our conflicts are themselves integral to establishing the
limits of toleration.
Steven Heyman's paper steers us back to the substance of freedom of expression, but then pushes us to think beyond its doctrinal
parameters. The general formulation of First Amendment speech
rights, he argues, was meant to entail a larger balancing of rights and
interests. The limits of tolerance in freedom of expression cannot be
found within the First Amendment's general directive, but rather are
necessarily those defined by other rights embedded in the Constitution, most fundamentally equality rights.
The papers in this symposium cover a large spectrum of ideas,
but no one seems to think that neutrality is an attainable or even
desirable goal. Cultural norms are always either directly or indirectly
implicated in legal discourse and so the question is how tolerant are
those norms. Is toleration simply a matter of guarding against
5. Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
717, 722 (2003).
6. Post, supra note 1, at 502.
7. Id. at 504.
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coercive practices or ensuring effective exit strategies? Do we need
to pursue perfectionist policies that encourage a more thoroughgoing
tolerant society; and if so, how best do we pursue such policies?
There must be limits to toleration, limits that are no doubt both
contingent on and constitutive of American culture broadly speaking;
but the advantage of viewing the legal regulation of cultural conflicts
through this notion is that, like all the papers, it inherently recognizes
an internal, culturally driven perspective, continually straining under
the demands of alternative cultural norms.

